Below is a reply to a colleague of mine, within a society for Military and Strategy Specialists/Analysts, who seemed to have missed the point I was making, ‘in praise of Gaddaffi Model of COIN’ and not ”NATO’s”. So, I thought, I might as well stick it here for readers of the blog;
Excellent Points Skip Klauber,
However, you reference is to NATO’s COIN Ops, mine was Gaddaffi’s COIN Ops.
In Short, my overriding argument was that, Gaddaffi decisive, firm, integrative and overall leadership in dealing with the initial crisis, the early stages of ‘rebellion’, was a brilliant approach to ”how-to-do-it” when dealing with insurgency, that the old practitioners, in the likes of Kitsons,Triniquier, Galula etc would have applauded as just brilliant.
And can be said, even with the intervention of the ”neo-imperials of Anglo-Frenchies” under the guise of NATO (disgracing an institution that had built a high reputation, just to see it flushed down the toilet with recent involvement in Libya, esp., the chairmanship of Ramussen, has been fatally inappropriate, the leaders who elected him should have recognise his ‘extreme managerial and leadership’ as ”strategically unfit” to international institution of such calibre or of even lesser; he is a fanatic dogmatist).
Anyway, as was stating, even with the transition, the way gaddaffi handled the shift from strategic offence to tactical defence was absolute brilliant, and has since stayed within this spectrum, thus, what Mao and Guerrilla practitioners, would refer to as, the Strategic Stalemate.
Thus, my argument and praises for Gaddaffi Martial Abilities (praise as you see it!).
My Colleague, Skip re-sent his original comment, and I would like to thank him for this, and here it is;
”MY ORIGINAL COMMENT:
I disagree, insofar as the type of relatively “free hand” (i.e., the U.S. media almost universally declines to criticize Obama) NATO (ha!) has, or at least had, should have allowed a military and political assessment that rendered COIN considerations minimal.
When we made the somewhat odd decision to begin military operations in Libya there was one clear, obvious tack for NATO to pursue. Take out Libyan command & control (i.e., air defenses) facilities & arm/protect the so-called rebels so as to create a secure territory centered around the Benghazi, etc. oil facilities & ports. Allow the Libyan rebels to establish their own safe-area, which would evolve into a country (“Cyrenaica”). Make the needed deals regarding oil; protect the integrity of the new nation (solely through air power); and train their police & military. And that’s all. No dead 19 yr old Marines, no huge 20+ yr commitment, etc. Basically- get out.
The above is all NATO has the ability to do. The RAF will do whatever it can in a prolonged, purposeless (“no endgame”) military situations, but the U.K. is initiating tremendous cuts in its military. As for the French, all you can (maybe) count on is air support, until they decide to turn tail. The “Armee” has some fine planes & pilots, but you cannot count on France (for internal political reasons- many Muslims, as well as the usual reasons) unless the goals are very limited & there is a big payoff. No other military in NATO has the capacity to do much of anything…except the U.S.
The suggested goal should have been the plan from day one of this incursion into Libya. It is all we can afford, gives us all the help from our “allies” (apologies to U.K., who are real allies) they can/will give, and creates a viable political situation in the post-incursion Libya area within the Middle East. (Specifically, if we keep our hands off the gov’t of the new “Cyrenaica”, it creates a viable political situation in the M.E.!!)”.