Yes, the title does seem much more encompassing in breadth than what is to be the actual reality, which is a small brief or outline of how these factors come together in defining the end-game of the present crisis in Libya; the balance of probabilities, as to what the outcome might look like, is very much in favour of the existing regime under Mr. Muammar Gadhafi.
For a detailed, that newspaper article, outline of the part of this story, see an excellent article by Simon Tisdall in Guardian on Tuesday 12th April 2011 on the section, World Briefing, with a heading, ‘Dictator’s Survival, May be the price Cameron is to pay to end the war’. In short, this articles, looks at the strength of Libyan-African-Web of Relationships and Commercial Investments. The respect that Mr. Gadhafi seems to enjoy at both levels of the political ruling elites and the general public. The reason to this respect, from the anti-imperialism symbolism, to true, as quoting Museveni, the President of Uganda, ‘Gaddafi a true nationalist…I prefer nationalist to puppets”, this anti-western culture in Africa is widespread and a real issues of gravest concerns, to the return of neo-imperial age, already the IMF western-backed structural fund is labelled as ‘colonial new economic policy in Africa’.
Then there is a real honest ambition from Gadhafi himself in rebuilding a peaceful and prosperous Africa, with a new face of unity, under the banner of a ”United States of Africa”, read the Tisdal’s article for a breakdown of financial amount invested by the Libyan government to local African States. After China, Libya is the second biggest investor and developer in Africa.
It is these local strengths, and look goodwill, trust, friendship and symbolism of Mr. Gadhafi and the Revolutionary Libyan State which will tax a great deal of energy, resources, time and patience of any nations, bloc or coalition of the western world seeking to oust, i.e. implement a forceful regime change. And, if, that if ever able to do so, our standing in Africa, and with the Eastern powers, and newly ‘freed’ Arab states, will be almost non-existent, or rather with greater suspicious and absence of any goodwill from here on.
Whatever our short-term goals and interests might seems, the long term interest should override these, and should inform our present policy, with caution and alternative options, to what is at the present implemented. If Iraq was a strategic failure, then Libya, is Meta-Strategic Failure of highest degree. We risk deteriorating our external relations, near and far, friends and newly courted ones.