This was originally written on 14th of May 2011:
Now to the many aim of this post, the Hague Affairs: Why the British Foreign Policy is in Shambles? Tackling this issue at the present I will not be going into in-depth analysis and academic discussion to what is accepted generally to be rather the fall and fall of the British International Role and Diplomatic Influences. We had first, the Suez I of Eden, where things began to go all wrong for us, as the master spy, Dulles is constantly reported to have said, the Brits are still searching for their role in the new world politics. the events of Suez I, lost us the empire finally, and our standing within our old ‘colonial friends’, so we moved closer to the special relationship with the US, and this was brought to so close that we seemed to have just become a mirror-image of US Foreign Policy, and it was this that took us to our Suez II, the Blair War, which finally lost us whatever influence, role and respect we have had left in the world politics.
Above related is the external crisis that has for sometime contributed to present fall and ”disappearance” of the British foreign policy and diplomacy. Now lets look at the internal crisis, this I will only say three words, Getting Our Way , the work of the former British Ambassador to US, Christopher Meyer should be a mandatory reading for the mandarins at the Foreign Office. This work points the finger and I quite agree and argue as such way before the work was published, that it is the systemic failures within the FCO that which has been predominately responsible for the breakdown of our diplomatic and foreign policies and direction. The Management-isation of foreign policies and diplomacy, the overly diversification of foreign policies, with so many departments claiming a role, e.g. dept of int. development etc.
I wont take any more time at the present other than stating that, we have to clean the system first, and not put a blame, with ease, on Mr. Hague, for the issues not controlled by himself, but rather the ‘new culture’ at the foreign office that is, as mr. Meyers notes, and others, e.g. Sir Ivor Roberts, more pre-occupied with ‘managerial results and targets’ than the flexibility of traditional nature of diplomacy and foreign policy.
(for in-depth analysis, I will provide in due time a link to a location of my political essays and works)